On August 19, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa declaring jihad against the Kurds of Iran, marking a turning point in state-sanctioned violence against ethnic minorities. This article examines the historical, psychological, and legal dimensions of Kurdish suffering within the Islamic Republic of Iran. Drawing on concepts of collective trauma (Volkan, 2001; Alexander, 2004) and frameworks of international criminal law, the article situates Kurdish experiences within the definitions of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention, apartheid under the 1973 Apartheid Convention, and crimes against humanity under the 1998 Rome Statute. The analysis begins with personal and historical narratives, including the 1953 coup against Mossadegh and the 1979 fatwa, and explores how these events generated lasting social wounds and structural marginalization. The Kurdish case illustrates the mechanisms of 'slow genocide' (Feierstein, 2014), where the destruction of a people occurs through sustained violence, forced displacement, denial of cultural rights, and systemic impoverishment. The article argues that the policies of the Islamic Republic toward the Kurds not only constitute violations of fundamental human rights but also meet the legal thresholds of international criminal law. Recognition of these crimes is essential for both transitional justice and the pursuit of Kurdish self-determination within—or beyond—the framework of a democratic Iran.
The Kurdish population in Iran has long been subjected to cycles of repression, displacement, and political marginalization. While Kurdish demands for autonomy and cultural recognition predate the Islamic Republic, it was the issuance of Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa of jihad on August 19, 1979, that institutionalized the systematic targeting of Kurds under the guise of religious legitimacy.
This article explores the intersection of historical memory, collective trauma, and international criminal law in assessing the status of Kurdish suffering within Iran. It situates the Kurdish experience within two key historical ruptures: the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, which foreclosed the possibility of democratic pluralism, and the 1979 fatwa, which transformed Kurdistan into a battleground of state violence.
On August 19, 1953, a coup orchestrated by the CIA and MI6 overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh (Kinzer, 2003). This event destroyed Iran’s fragile democratic experiment and redirected political activity into authoritarian and religious channels. For Kurdish movements, this meant the closure of opportunities for open political participation that had briefly existed during Mossadegh’s premiership.
Just one year after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Khomeini issued a fatwa declaring jihad against the Kurds. The decree labeled Kurds as kuffar (infidels) and mohareb (enemies of God), thereby legitimizing mass killings, bombardments of villages, and forced displacement. The fatwa institutionalized Kurdish persecution not as a temporary military campaign but as a religious duty embedded in the ideology of the Islamic Republic.
Collective trauma is understood as the shared psychological and social injury experienced by a group following mass violence (Alexander, 2004; Volkan, 2001). It produces long-lasting scars that transcend individual experiences and are transmitted across generations.
In the summer of 1983, a deeply traumatic scene unfolded in the village of Khari near Urmia. My two-year-old nephew, Hiwa, and his mother had gone to fetch water from a spring. Suddenly, two helicopters of the Islamic Republic appeared above the village and opened fire. The mother, holding her child, ran toward their home. Bullets from heavy machine guns shattered the trees overhead, and only by chance did the branches shield them from being torn apart—a fate that befell many other children of that era.
This was not merely an isolated tragedy. It exemplified a systematic policy of religiously sanctioned violence, justified by Khomeini’s fatwa of jihad against the Kurds.
Kurdish collective trauma includes:
- Loss of security: Families and children were directly targeted, undermining basic safety.
- Structural displacement: Villages destroyed, populations impoverished, and opportunities for development erased.
- Cultural repression: Religious decrees branding Kurds as “infidels” fractured relations with the state irreparably.
Feierstein (2014) conceptualizes such policies as 'slow genocide'—the gradual annihilation of a people through sustained repression, poverty, and cultural erasure.
Under the Genocide Convention (UNGA, 1948), genocide includes killing members of a group, causing serious mental or bodily harm, and inflicting life conditions calculated to destroy the group. The Islamic Republic’s actions against Kurds—including mass executions, torture, and systematic displacement—fit squarely within these categories.
The Apartheid Convention (UNGA, 1973) defines apartheid as the domination of one group over another through systematic oppression. The denial of Kurdish cultural rights, prohibition of Kurdish language education, and exclusion from political participation reflect a distinctly Iranian form of apartheid.
The Rome Statute (ICC, 1998) identifies persecution on political, ethnic, cultural, or religious grounds as a crime against humanity. Anchored in the fatwa, the Islamic Republic’s treatment of Kurds constitutes an organized campaign of persecution that falls under this statute.
While the 1980s witnessed overt military campaigns against Kurdistan, repression has since expanded into structural and cultural dimensions:
- Imprisonment and execution of activists undermining civic engagement.
- Spread of narcotics and espionage networks weakening social cohesion.
- Ban on mother-tongue education erasing cultural continuity.
- Structural impoverishment preventing economic development.
Taken together, these measures represent crimes against humanity that extend beyond wartime violence into peacetime governance.
August 19 represents more than a historical date; it is a symbol of Kurdish collective trauma and systemic persecution. The Islamic Republic’s policies—rooted in the fatwa of jihad—meet the thresholds of genocide, apartheid, and crimes against humanity under international law.
Recognition of these crimes is crucial for advancing justice and ensuring accountability. It is equally vital for supporting Kurdish claims to self-determination within the broader struggle for democracy and human rights in Iran. Only through such recognition can the traumas of the past be addressed and the foundations for reconciliation be laid.
Alexander, J. C. (2004). Toward a theory of cultural trauma. In J. C. Alexander et al. (Eds.), Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity (pp. 1–30). University of California Press.
Feierstein, D. (2014). Genocide as social practice: Reorganizing society under the Nazis and Argentina’s military juntas. Rutgers University Press.
International Criminal Court (ICC). (1998). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2187.
Kinzer, S. (2003). All the Shah’s men: An American coup and the roots of Middle East terror. John Wiley & Sons.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (1948). Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. UN Treaty Series, vol. 78.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (1973). International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. UN Treaty Series, vol. 1015.
Volkan, V. D. (2001). Transgenerational transmissions and chosen traumas: An aspect of large-group identity. Group Analysis, 34(1), 79–97.
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