On May 30, 2025, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO) told Yle for the first time that Iran is conducting espionage in Finland. This is the first time SUPO has publicly named Iran as a state actor that poses a threat to Finnish national security. Until now, Iran's influence operations in Europe have largely been known only within security circles and among certain experts. Now that Iran is officially listed alongside Russia and China, one must ask: why only now?

I have warned Finnish authorities about this development for over twenty years.

In 1999, I submitted to SUPO the first documented information about the structure of Iran’s espionage networks operating in Finland. This was not a general concern, but involved specific cases where agents or proxies of the Iranian regime monitored, approached, or pressured dissidents.

In October 2004, I was personally targeted in an attempted abduction aboard a Silja Line ferry. I reported the incident to the police, but the authorities did not take the matter seriously at the time. The incident was part of a broader Iranian strategy aimed at silencing members of the opposition living in exile—not just within Iran's borders, but internationally. I later submitted full details of the case to the Finnish Security Intelligence Service in Lappeenranta.

Many dissidents have reported that their family members in Iran have been threatened or pressured in order to coerce their relatives abroad into cooperating with Iranian intelligence networks. This is a brutal but effective tactic that turns psychological pressure into a tool of cross-border repression.

In 2007, I met with Kimmo Sasi, then Chair of the Finnish Parliament’s Constitutional Law Committee, to discuss Iran’s efforts to infiltrate Finnish universities—particularly technical institutions. The concern was not only about technology transfers, but also about surveillance and influence operations within the academic community.

Iran’s operational model is based on multilayered networks. In addition to official diplomatic channels, the country employs indirect actors such as religious emissaries, fake organizations, cultural centers, and—in the worst cases—even organized crime groups. These actors can be used for intelligence gathering, intimidation, or, as seen elsewhere in Europe, violent operations.

Finland and other Nordic countries are open societies built on freedom of speech and the right to protection. This is precisely why, from the perspective of authoritarian regimes like Iran, they are “soft targets.” We offer refuge to the persecuted—but not always enough protection from the persecutors.

SUPO’s public statement is a welcome and necessary step. But it should also prompt a review of how earlier warnings were handled. Was the silence due to ignorance—or political caution?

Confronting these kinds of actors is not merely a question of national security. It is a question of how we define the ethical and democratic backbone of our state. Is Finland a country where authoritarian powers can operate freely—or a country that draws a clear line against human rights violations, even on its own soil?